Mission Command/ Command and Control

 

The Force Engaged

The Force Engaged

Published: April-June 1923

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COMBAT GROUP SCHIMPF AT LOUVAIN

Combat Group "Schimpf" at louvain

Translated by Major A. Vollmer

Peace-time exercises involving a reinforced infantry regiment are often based on the sudden assembly and arrival of reinforcements, or other troops not belonging to the division, who have been withdrawn from another point and are put at the disposal of the, local commander. In 1914 there was an example of this, not common on the west front.

Published: March 1933

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A Critical Analysis of the Operations of the German Forces Opposed to the American 1st Division from 1-11 October, 1918

A Critical Analysis of the Operations of the German Forces Opposed to the American 1st Division from 1-11 October, 1918

Maj. M.S. Eddy, Infantry

This is a study and a critical analysis of the tactical operations of those forces of the German Army which were opposed to the American 1st Division in that phase of the Meuse-Argonne campaign of the World War, between 1 October and 11 October, 1918. It is based on the operations of these forces as actually depicted by their respective war diaries, combat· reports, messages, and other records, most of which were written on the battlefield during the period covered, the translations of which are contained in Volume IV, World War Records, First Division, A.E.F. (German Documents, Meuse-Argonne).

Published: September 1935

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Joint Operation Aspects of the Okinawa Campaign

Joint Operation Aspects of the Okinawa Campaign

Lt. Col. Walter Killilae, General Staff Corps

Okinawa, which is about sixty-live miles long and averages about five miles in width, is roughly divided into almost equal northern and southern parts by the Ishikawa Isthmus. The northern area is generally rugged, mountainous, wooded, undeveloped, and of little military value. The southern arca, which is generally rolling, but frequently broken by deep gullies and ravines, is the developed part of the island and contains a major portion of the island's 400,000 population. As anticipated the strongest defenses of the island were in the southern area.

Published: June 1947

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The Art of Military Command: An 11th Century View

The Art of Military Command: An 11th Century View

Robert Devereux

The art of warfare has undergone constant and far-reaching changes during the course of history. In most aspects warfare as practiced in 500 B.C., for example, when Sun Tzu wrote The Art of War-the oldest military treatise known to exist-bears little resemblance to warfare today. Through the centuries, however, one element of warfare has changed but little: the art of military command. Other things being equal, the army most competently commanded usually has achieved victory.

Published: January 1958

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Electronic Despotism: A Serious Problem of Modern Command

Electronic Despotism: A Serious Problem of Modern Command

Maj. Keith C. Nusbaum

Instant communications are now possible over vast distances. The seat of Government can reach theater commanders in only a few seconds. Theater commanders can reach their subordinates over distances of hundreds or even thousands of miles in equal time. Communications are now possible between agencies and echelons which heretofore contacted each other infrequently, if at all.

Published: April 1962

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The Acute Need for Simulation Command Training

The Acute Need for Simulation Command Training

Col. Wesley W. Yale, U.S. Army, Retired

“The commander goes where he can best control the action." This was the advice once handed out by the training manuals. Strangely, no voices were heard to ask, "And where in the hell is that?" As if in answer, a brigadier general, participating in a post-Korea maneuver, was charged with the leadership of a combined arms task force.

Published: December 1972

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Fog and Friction: Challenges to Command and Control

Fog and Friction: Challenges to Command and Control

Lt. Col. Clayton R. Newell, U.S. Army

Command and control, or C2, is one of the premier concepts in today's US Army. Effectively directing friendly forces against an enemy, imposing the commander's will on the opposing command structure and winning are the ultimate aims of a C2 system. But many factors work against C2 systems, and the commander must recognize and deal with these challenges before C2 can assure success on the battlefield.

Published: August 1987

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Battle Command: A Force XXI Imperative

Battle Command: A Force XXI Imperative

Maj. James C Madigan, U.S. Army
Maj. George E. Dodge, U.S. Army

To accomplish the ultimate goal of command at battalion and higher, the future commander must learn skills, develop competencies and ingrain his craft into everything he does. There are no breaks. Self-development and study are key. … Should he not spend at least as much time training and developing [his mind] as he does his body?

Published: November 1994

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Network-Enabled Battle Command

Network-Enabled Battle Command

Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, U.S. Army

This article is reprinted from the winter 2004/2005 issue of RUSI Defence Systems, the Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall, London. British spelling and punctuation conventions are preserved as in the original article.—Editor.

Published: May-June 2005

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Noncommissioned Officers and Mission Command

Noncommissioned Officers and Mission Command

Sgt. Maj. Dennis Eger, U.S. Army

The senior enlisted advisor for the Mission Command Center of Excellence highlights the need for noncommissioned officers at every level to understand the doctrinal concepts of mission command because they have a primary role in its success.

Published: September-October 2014

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The Trouble with Mission Command: Army Culture and Leader Assumptions

The Trouble with Mission Command: Army Culture and Leader Assumptions

Maj. Dave Devine, U.S. Army

To successfully adopt a mission command approach, the Army must first examine several pervasive leader behaviors and challenge the underlying assumptions that leaders rely upon to solve problems and achieve success. This article won second place in the 2021 MacArthur Military Leadership Writing Competition.

Published: September-October 2021

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