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Armory to Port

The Challenges of Deploying an Army National Guard Division

 

Maj. Gen. Charles Kemper, Minnesota Army National Guard
Maj. Jessica Haugaard, Minnesota Army National Guard*

 

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The Army National Guard (ARNG) has been involved in the Global War on Terrorism and subsequent operations for over twenty years. Compared to active-duty units, ARNG divisions are tasked to overcome the tyranny of distance as they manage units spread hundreds (or thousands) of miles apart. For preplanned deployments managed through the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP), ARNG units are traditionally notified months before deployment, but what happens if an ARNG division is called upon to “fight tonight”?

As U.S. joint operations move toward near-peer competition, the Army has shifted focus to its divisions, which are now the units of action in the Army’s multidomain operations concept.¹ Since 2020, the ARNG has realigned its major commands into interstate organizations through a concept termed “operational division alignment” (ODA): eight division headquarters aligned with brigades across multiple states that, when activated under federal authority, would deploy together in support of large-scale combat operations (LSCO).²

Answering the Question

In fall 2022, Lt. Gen. Jon Jensen, director of the ARNG, supported a request by the Combined Arms Center (CAC) to analyze the length of time it would require to deploy a full ARNG division. He directed the question to leadership within the 34th Infantry Division (34ID), who embraced the challenge and analyzed the problem set for several months. 34ID staff explored how long it would take to rapidly mobilize and deploy 34ID under the ODA concept into the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR). Dubbed “Armory to Port,” 34ID’s analysis examined the challenges and implications of a no-notice deployment from the perspectives of staff members and agencies responsible for moving 34ID overseas.

Formally established in 1917, 34ID “Red Bulls” has been involved in conflicts dating back to World War I; notably, during World War II, the Sandstorm Division was the first division deployed into North Africa during Operation Torch, where it spearheaded the taking of Hill 609 in Tunisia.³ 34ID participated in other major campaigns during World War II, including Anzio and Salerno, and during more than five hundred days of frontline combat, the Sandstorm Division earned three presidential unit citations, eleven Medals of Honor, ninety-eight Distinguished Service Crosses, and 1,153 Silver Stars. Since World War II, the Red Bulls have been involved in the Global War on Terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan; other operations or missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Egypt, Honduras, Kuwait, and central Europe; and multiple homeland defense missions.⁴

While its Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion, most of the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, and portions of 34th Expeditionary Combat Aviation Brigade including headquarters are assigned to the Minnesota Army National Guard, the entirety of 34ID, as operationally aligned, is comprised of nine brigades, forty-six battalions, and 240 companies that span across twenty-nine states. 34ID consists of over twenty-seven thousand soldiers and over seven thousand pieces of prime moving equipment (see figure 1).⁵ Planning efforts accounted for units forecasted to align with 34ID in the future, such as a division cavalry squadron.

34ID staff was charged to identify friction points that could delay immediate deployment and to provide recommendations to streamline the process. Ultimately, it was determined that an individual brigade combat team (BCT) could be mobilized, trained, and deployed in forty-seven to fifty days (from notification of sourcing to the last piece of equipment leaving the Port of Tacoma, Washington). In its entirety, 34ID could mobilize and deploy in seventy-five to eighty days.⁶ Several steps could allow individual BCTs to deploy up to sixteen days more quickly, leading to a faster ARNG division deployment (see figure 2). (Timelines do not include shipment of equipment overseas into USINDOPACOM, which would add an estimated fourteen to twenty-one days.)⁷

To culminate this effort, and at the request of CAC leadership, Brig. Gen. Derek Adams, the 34ID assistant division commander for support, presented the armory-to-port analysis and its results to leadership from the CAC centers of excellence during the Combined Arms Seminar at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in summer 2023.

Planning Factors

The 34ID staff made several assumptions during their analysis of the problem set. Most importantly, the no-notice deployment would occur under perfect, uncontested conditions without introducing complicating factors such as enemy reconnaissance, cyberattacks, degraded communications, infrastructure collapse, overcrowded rail lines, etc. Ultimately, this uncontested environment would provide a perfect backdrop against which complicating factors such as enemy activity could be analyzed in the future. The staff conducted the armory-to-port analysis under favorable environmental and weather conditions: no competition existed for heavy railcars, all rail lines were functional and could be easily transported, and no adverse weather conditions were present, which could shut down or significantly delay routes (most notably, those that pass through the Rocky Mountains).

To expedite the deployment process, staff assumed that battalion-level units would send half of their equipment straight from their respective armories to the Port of Tacoma and the other half to mobilization force generation installations (MFGIs) for unit training. This decision expedited the shipping of some equipment outside the continental United States while allowing concurrent training at seven separate MFGIs around the United States.

Significantly, a highly trained BCT with modernized equipment that mobilized immediately left its equipment behind and deployed overseas within days of activation, drawing new equipment from the Army Prepositioned Stock 3-Afloat. This solved two problems: it allowed 34ID to project itself overseas quickly, and it allowed a separate BCT with legacy equipment to fall in on modernized equipment from its sister BCT as training for deployment began.

Finally, the Port of Tacoma was selected as the seaport of embarkation (SPOE), as it is a likely location from which equipment would be shipped into the USINDOPACOM AOR (see figure 3). The Port of Tacoma has significantly more experience handling military equipment than other seaports on the West Coast, and its throughput is among the best in the region.⁸

Armory-to-Port Scenario

The paragraphs below break down the activities required to prepare, mobilize, and deploy. These include the readiness of personnel and equipment, unit movements, and other factors in 34ID’s no-notice deployment and the amount of time factored for each activity.

Notification of sourcing (two days). For a typical deployment (as part of the GFMAP), the National Guard Bureau (NGB) issues a notification of sourcing to all states that contain units identified to deploy. Each state governor weighs this federalized mission against competing priorities in their state, and they choose whether to support the GFMAP mission. If accepted, the respective state joint force headquarters initiates a calling sequence that ends with each soldier receiving instructions about where to muster and begin mobilization activities. The process to initiate a no-notice deployment is similar to the GFMAP notification process, except during crises resulting in congressional declarations of war, presidential declarations of national emergencies, or situations where ARNG support is required immediately.⁹ (A no-notice deployment such as the one presented here may fall into this category.)¹⁰

Home-station activities (twelve days). Once ARNG units receive notification to mobilize, all personnel report to their respective battalion areas to begin home-station activities. This decision simplifies the mustering process by reducing reporting requirements from 240 company locations to forty-six battalion locations and saving one to two days.

Home-station activities include medical and administrative processes conducted during a soldier readiness processing (SRP) event to determine the deployability of each soldier. This step is crucial to the mobilization process because issues caught too late may result in a soldier being sent home. The SRP event confirms that soldiers are administratively deployable, that all pertinent paperwork is completed with no issues (medical profiles, powers of attorney, Records of Emergency Data (DD Form 93), Service Members’ Group Life Insurance, prescriptions, etc.), and that a soldier has no medical issues that will become a distraction to the mission. Importantly, commanders will validate soldiers’ family care plans so each family will not face undue hardship when a soldier departs.¹¹

In addition to SRP, soldiers will be issued additional uniforms and equipment, receive new identification cards (as needed), validate health insurance enrollment, conduct individual training, and otherwise prepare the soldier for follow-on movement. Other aspects of home-station activities include equipment maintenance and preparation for shipment. All rolling stock and other equipment will be consolidated at the battalion area, where it is then inventoried, moved into maintenance, cleared to deploy (or repaired quickly), and prepared for shipment. The equipment needed for collective training is sent to MFGI, and all other equipment is sent straight to the Port of Tacoma. Equipment that cannot be quickly repaired (either at the unit location or MFGI) is usually left behind.

MFGI activities (twenty-one days). Upon completing of home-station activities, soldiers are sent to one of seven MFGIs. First Army is responsible for ARNG unit validation; it partners with ARNG units to train on their mission essential task list and accomplish deployment tasks, and it ensures that each unit is prepared for its mission overseas. Typical unit training at MFGI includes a culminating training event, collective-level ranges, classroom instruction, small-unit training, and a final SRP event to clear each soldier for deployment.

In addition to these tasks, units conduct equipment training in preparation for their mission. As training is completed, soldiers continue to maintain equipment and prepare it for rail movement to the Port of Tacoma and subsequent overseas shipment. In some instances, a unit may choose to ship its equipment by truck to its destination.

Onward movement (twelve days). At the conclusion of MFGI activities, soldiers board planes and deploy into the USINDOPACOM AOR, and the unit’s remaining equipment is moved by rail to the Port of Tacoma. It takes an estimated six days to move equipment from the furthest MFGI to the Port of Tacoma (see figure 4); once there, it takes an additional six days to unload it from trains, reload it onto ships, and begin movement overseas. On average, it takes eleven days for a full armored or infantry BCT to be loaded onto ships.¹² For planning purposes in the armory-to-port analysis, one-half of a BCT’s equipment is loaded while a unit’s personnel are at MFGI, and the other half is loaded at the completion of MFGI activities. (See figure 5 for 34ID ship loading estimates.) From the time the ship leaves port, it takes an estimated fourteen to twenty-one days for equipment to reach its destination in the USINDOPACOM AOR.¹³

Lessons Learned during the Armory-to-Port Scenario Analysis

The armory-to-port analysis identified several friction points. A discussion of lessons learned, opportunities, and recommendations follows.

Tyranny of distance. In most active-duty environments, Army units are contained within a small geographical footprint. In the event of a no-notice deployment or exercise, both personnel and equipment can quickly muster in preparation for follow-on activities. The environment for most ARNG units is the opposite: personnel might travel hundreds of miles to their unit of assignment, and a unit’s equipment could be spread across a large geographical area. The 34th Expeditionary Combat Aviation Brigade, for example, is headquartered in Minnesota, but it has seven companies based in Hawaii, which fall under battalions based in Idaho and Montana (see figure 6).¹⁴ In these instances, the ability to quickly gather unit personnel and equipment at battalion locations is compromised.

Lack of practice. Since the implementation of the ARNG ODA concept in 2020, a full-blown activation of the modern ARNG division has never been exercised using personnel or equipment. A limited number of simulations have occurred, including several tabletop exercises and a 3-D simulation of armory-to-port analysis presented at the 2023 Combined Arms Seminar.

It should be noted that each deployable unit in the ARNG is required to create mobilization plans in support of GFMAP or LSCO.¹⁵ While this is helpful, a full-blown tabletop exercise will allow leaders at all levels to grasp the complexity of a no-notice deployment. Such an exercise should include the NGB, First Army, Installation Management Command (to represent MFGIs), Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, ARNG leadership (from division, brigade, and battalion levels), and Forces Command representation. Multiple iterations of this exercise will identify tactical and operational challenges and will open necessary dialogue as key leaders work through the planning process.

Chokepoints at MFGI. The certification and validation of soldier and unit task competency are vital as units prepare to assume a federalized mission. For the ARNG, this is completed in coordination with First Army, and the bulk of training occurs at MFGI.

The initial chokepoints at MFGI occur in areas of limited throughput, such as ranges or the Medical Simulation Training Center. The situation is exacerbated when multiple large units are competing for limited resources, especially on a short timeline.

One possible solution to alleviate capacity concerns is determining which training and validation activities could be conducted at home station rather than MFGI. This is a more common solution during defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) missions.¹⁶ It was used during the COVID pandemic when movement was severely limited, and it is routine during GFMAP missions (albeit on longer timelines).¹⁷ Optimally, units conduct all training (aside from ranges) at home station, then ship only the minimal amount of equipment needed for these and other collective training events to MFGI. This will save an estimated four to five days at MFGI because soldiers will not be forced to wait in long queues for resources nor will they need to prepare as much equipment for shipment from MFGI to the Port of Tacoma.

Another solution is to keep one or two training equipment sets (TES) on-hand at MFGI (or require the NGB to source TES from nonsourced units for use). This would permit units to ship equipment directly from home station to SPOE. Alternatively, those units slated to deploy later in the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data process could send their equipment to MFGI immediately upon activation, allowing those units deploying earlier to rotate through the same equipment set (with the owning unit deploying with its original equipment). Both solutions will save most units an estimated twelve to fourteen days since they will not need to worry about shipping equipment from MFGI to SPOE.

If home-station activities are conducted as described, and if ARNG units fell in on TES at MFGI (or equipment owned by another unit), most BCTs could expect to save around sixteen days of time—allowing a BCT to mobilize and deploy its personnel in thirty-one to thirty-four days after notification of sourcing (and the unit would meet its equipment overseas). After accounting for capacity issues at the Port of Tacoma, a full ARNG division could deploy in seventy-five to seventy-eight days.¹⁸ Port capacity and throughput is the major chokepoint in this new scenario—the number of days needed to deploy a full ARNG division could be reduced by several days if more than one SPOE is utilized to ship equipment overseas.

Movement of equipment. A few considerations emerge as equipment moves across the country. The first is railcar ownership—different types of equipment require different types of railcars, and many of those railcars are owned outside of the U.S. Army.¹⁹ As a result, rail operations for military equipment are often contracted to major railroad companies, and there may be competition for rail assets in crises.

If this is the case, the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) may have an answer. For units with excessively heavy equipment (such as an armored brigade combat team), SDDC is equipped with hundreds of DODX-marked flat and special-purpose railcars designed to move equipment such as tanks.²⁰ The largest constraint in a LSCO environment may be that 34ID is forced to compete for DODX railcars with other military units that are deploying for the same reason.

A third consideration is quantity of rail spurs. The speed with which equipment can be loaded onto trains is dictated by the number of spurs, which can dramatically delay the deployment process (see figure 7). The last friction point occurs during winter months when weather may affect both the transport of equipment onto railcars and railroad trafficability during harsh weather. This could significantly increase timelines—in these instances, trucks could be the most expeditious method to transport equipment.

Finally, the armory-to-port analysis only accounted for equipment transport through the Port of Tacoma—during an actual no-notice deployment, 34ID (and other ARNG ODAs) would use as many seaports as possible to transport equipment. This may offer mixed results. Using multiple seaport locations could lessen equipment congestion, but that advantage may be offset by smaller port capacity and longer load times.

General ARNG Challenges to No-Notice Deployments

Several challenges are inherent to the ARNG, ultimately affecting an ARNG unit’s ability to mobilize and deploy immediately.

Competing missions. Each ARNG unit has two missions: a statewide mission in response to DSCA (or other regional) incidents and the support of Title 10 missions when federalized.²¹ One of the greatest challenges under the ODA model is that it is up to each state governor to determine whether units within their borders will support Title 10 missions.

For 34ID, the ODA mission brings operational challenges because, at any given time, several units aligned with 34ID are also tasked with other missions like overseas GFMAP deployments or various homeland defense and homeland security missions. For example, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 35th Engineer Brigade, is tasked to support a nationwide DSCA response mission. If the entirety of 34ID as operationally aligned is activated, then Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 35th Engineer Brigade, cannot support the DSCA mission if they are mobilized with 34ID. If that occurs, a decision must be made to task a different engineer brigade headquarters to mobilize and deploy with 34ID or to task another unit with the DSCA mission.

To deconflict Headquarters, Department of the Army-level missions with the ARNG ODA mission, the NGB should either designate a “next up” unit to support those units with dual missions or long-term competing priorities (DSCA, rapid continental U.S. deployment, etc.), or simply assign other units to the ODA framework instead.

While division commanders are ultimately responsible for the readiness of their units, the ARNG is not designed so that those commanders can exercise de facto command authority over any units outside of their states (i.e., a division commander cannot mandate that units beyond its borders participate in a command post exercise). Unless federalized, any training or relationships that occur between organizations are simply a matter of goodwill. It is entirely possible that an ARNG division commander might deploy with aligned brigades that have never trained together, which would introduce additional risk into an already stressful environment.

Training of personnel. A consistent challenge for any ARNG unit is its ability to train and maintain tactical and technical proficiency of its soldiers. Each ARNG mobilization day soldier is statutorily allocated thirty-nine training days per year, which includes one two-day weekend drill each month and fifteen days of annual training each year. While some training does occur monthly, the result is that a soldier must choose between completing professional military education or joining their units during annual training to train on collective mission proficiency. This situation could result in lower T ratings on a Commander’s Unit Status Report due to lack of leader presence, and it could challenge team-building efforts at the squad and platoon levels.

An additional consideration is that ARNG personnel tend to “grow up” within the same state, where they alternate between units and work with the same people throughout their careers. While great for unit cohesion, this type of atmosphere can silo soldiers so that they are unfamiliar with outside units; personnel; and tactics, techniques, and procedures. In a high-stress environment like deployment, the unfamiliarity can breed risks that commanders must carefully consider.

To mitigate these realities, ARNG units should seek opportunities to train with other units within their respective ODAs. The NGB should take the lead on aligning these opportunities. ARNG ODAs should conduct multiunit training within the division, and planners should seek opportunities to integrate unit training during combat training center rotations, Warfighters, etc. This will permit units to develop working relationships and take advantage of capabilities outside their state. 34ID is currently implementing this integration into its upcoming STAFFEX 2025 exercise. South Dakota’s 196th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade and Minnesota’s 34th Division Artillery, 34th Expeditionary Combat Aviation Brigade, and 34ID headquarters and headquarters battalion are participating in a multiechelon, division-level exercise with participants across multiple states.

Equipment readiness. Equipment readiness is one of the greatest challenges for ARNG units, especially if they are tasked to deploy immediately. Readiness levels vary considerably; during fiscal year 2024, equipment readiness across platforms in the ARNG ranged from over 90 percent down to less than 50 percent.²² Any equipment that doesn’t meet the 10/20-level standards presents risk during no-notice deployment operations, as broken or dysfunctional equipment that cannot be fixed prior to MFGI movement will probably be left behind. ARNG division commanders (and other state leaders) are faced with additional obstacles because they cannot direct the allocation of financial resources for additional parts or maintenance to their brigades across state lines.

The modernization of equipment presents additional challenges. 34ID, for example, has over seven thousand prime movers, including over 250 tanks, over four hundred Bradley Fighting Vehicles, over eight hundred Joint Light Tactical Vehicles, and nearly 150 M88 recovery vehicles.²³ Equipment is maintained during the Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM) cycle, a sixty-month training model that, in part, incorporates the fielding of new equipment.²⁴

One challenge presented by the ReARMM is that not all units within ARNG ODAs field new equipment at the same time.²⁵ As a result, ARNG units that have yet to receive modernized equipment may be forced to deploy with legacy equipment, which could cause communication issues (and other problems) across platforms.

To combat equipment readiness challenges, the NGB should determine how each state prioritizes the maintenance of its equipment (especially with respect to ReARMM), analyze the results, and then restructure funding to resolve equipment problems (especially among pacing items). The NGB should also examine options to align ReARMM so that entire ODAs are modernized at the same time. At the unit level, each unit should utilize Global Combat Support System-Army to its full capacity to identify problems with maintenance early, and leaders should be aggressive in maintaining equipment readiness.

Conclusion

The armory-to-port project highlighted the challenges of immediately mobilizing and deploying an ARNG division. While the current estimated time to deploy an entire ARNG ODA is between seventy-five and eighty days, a few steps can expedite the process.

First Army (in conjunction with the NGB) has the greatest ability to shorten the deployment process by reevaluating which tasks can be completed at home station, then removing those items from MFGI activities. Second, deployment timelines can be significantly shortened if MFGI sites provide TES for deploying units (or the NGB could direct the sourcing of TES from nondeploying units to MFGI sites). In coordination with their state joint force headquarters and First Army, ARNG divisions can make the greatest impact by deliberately exercising no-notice deployment tabletop exercises to streamline the mobilization and deployment process and facilitate communication among key leaders.

Next, ARNG units must take deliberate steps throughout the year to improve soldier readiness and, especially, equipment readiness, as both will impact unit capabilities during no-notice deployments. Aligning ReARMM to ARNG divisions may be the best solution to prioritize limited resources.

Even if only one or two recommendations from this article are implemented, the time to deploy an ARNG division could shorten substantially. It is entirely feasible for ARNG BCTs to deploy in as little as one month and for full ARNG ODAs to deploy in less than two and a half months, but it will require focused effort.

Preparing the ARNG for LSCO is challenging but attainable. The more that the ARNG can prepare now for the realities of near-peer competition, the more quickly it will be able to deploy the warfighter (and equipment) into a LSCO fight.

The authors wish to thank Brig. Gen. Derek Adams, Maj. Thomas Miller, Maj. Tracy Mankowski, Maj. Christopher Metzger, and Sgt. Maj. Matthew Merrill for their contributions to this article.

 

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Notes

1. Walt A. Reed and Justin T. DeLeon, “The Agile U.S. Army Division in a Multidomain Environment,” Military Review 104, no. 5 (September/October 2024): 40, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/SO-24/SO-24-Army-Division/.
2. Drew Brooks, “Rebirth of the Divisions,” National Guard 74, no. 8 (September 2020): 18–21, https://www.ngaus.org/magazine/rebirth-divisions.
3. David Baker, “Despite British Critics – Americans Proved Their Worth on Hill 609, War History Online, 12 October 2018, https://www.warhistoryonline.com/instant-articles/americans-hill-609.html.
4. Jack K. Johnson, “History of the 34th “Red Bull” Infantry Division” (Little Falls, MN: Minnesota Military Museum, November 2015), https://www.mnmilitarymuseum.org/files/9314/7508/3526/34th_ID_history_1917-2015.pdf.
5. Modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE; 2024) for 34th Infantry Division (34ID) operational division alignment units from the U.S. Army’s Force Management System Website (FMSWeb) [CAC required], accessed 11 October 2024, https://fmsweb.fms.army.mil. Data retrieved multiple times between December 2022 and June 2023.
6. Jessica Haugaard, “Armory to Port” (white paper, Arden Hills, MN: 34ID [Minnesota Army National Guard], 8 October 2023). This is the white paper upon which this article is based.
7. Joshua Winkleman (major, 34ID G-4) and John Kremmin (chief warrant officer 3, 34ID G-4), in conversation with Haugaard, spring 2023. These individuals used U.S. Transportation Command resources and personal experience to estimate transport time by sea from the Port of Seattle to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility.
8. Gannett Flemming, “Port of Tacoma, WA,” in Ports for National Defense Strategic Seaport Analysis (Scott Air Force Base, IL: Office of the Special Assistant for Transportation Engineering, March 2020), 72–73.
9. Department of Defense Instruction 1235.12, Accessing the Reserve Components (RC) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 28 February 2017), 16, 28–31, https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodi/123512p.pdf.
10. Soldiers in the ARNG are “mobilized” once they are brought on federal Title 10 orders (and are effectively on active duty), and they are “deployed” once they leave the continental United States. It is possible for a soldier to be “mobilized” onto Title 10 orders but to remain at home station supporting rear detachment activities.
11. More information on family care plans can be found in Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 24 July 2020), sec. 5-3.
12. Gannett Flemming, “Port of Tacoma,” 79.
13. Winkleman and Kremmin, conversation.
14. MTOE for 34ID operational division alignment units from the U.S. Army’s Force Management System Website (FMSWeb) [CAC required].
15. For more information, refer to U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)/Army National Guard (ARNG) Regulation 55-1, Unit Movement Planning (Fort Bragg, NC: FORSCOM, 3 August 2020), https://www.ngbpmc.ng.mil/Portals/27/Publications/special%20documents/FORSCOM%20(ARNG)%20Reg%2055-1_20200803.pdf.
16. Michael Zultak, “Mobilizing the ARNG: Foundational in Framing Defense of the Homeland [Strategic Research Requirement]” (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1 March 2022), 2.
17. Warren Marlow, “Working Together, Lessons Learned Topics of First Army Large Scale Mobilization Operations Forum,” Army.mil, 24 September 2020, https://www.army.mil/article/239370/.
18. Haugaard, “Armory to Port.”
19. Michael Peck, “Why the U.S. Army’s Rail Transport System Is a Wreck,” 29 September 2021, Forbes (website), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2021/09/29/why-the-us-armys-rail-transport-system-is-a-wreck/?sh=5e5dc9c278ab.
20. Mitch Chandran, “Small SDDC Branch Provides Big Cost-Savings for DOD,” Army.mil, 27 August 2012, https://www.army.mil/article/86251/Small_SDDC_branch_provides_big_cost_savings_for_DOD/.
21. William Banks, “Expert Backgrounder: Federalizing the National Guard and Domestic Use of the Military,” Just Security, 21 February 2024, https://www.justsecurity.org/92568/expert-backgrounder-federalizing-the-national-guard-and-domestic-use-of-the-military/.
22. “Enterprise Material Status Reporting [Data Pull (Previous 13 Months)],” Logistics Data Analysis Center, accessed 24 September 2024, https://dataviz.ldac.army.mil.
23. MTOE for 34ID operational division alignment units from the U.S. Army’s Force Management System Website (FMSWeb) [CAC required].
24. Andrew Feickert, The Army’s Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model, Congressional Research Service No. IF11670 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 22 September 2022), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11670.
25. “Army Synchronization Tool,” Force Pool Synchronization Calendar, accessed 24 September 2024. This information was shared with Haugaard by Maj. Joshua Winkleman, 34ID G-4 officer in charge.

 

 

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