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Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD

Back to Basics:

A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD

By Lieutenant Colonel Scott C. Farquhar (Gen. Ed.)

156 Pages

Published: 2009

The Israeli incursions into Lebanon in mid-2006 and into Gaza in late 2008/early 2009 are important studies in contrasts. During the first, often termed “the Second Lebanon War,” Hezbollah fought Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) seeking hostage rescue and retribution to a bloody standstill. During the second, Hamas enjoyed far less success against the same forces avowedly in pursuit of only self-defense.

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Occasional Paper 21 - Flipside of the COIN: Israel's Lebanese Incursion Between 1982-2000

Flipside of the COIN: Israel's Lebanese Incursion Between 1982-2000

Occasional Paper 21

By Daniel Isaac Helmer

122 Pages

Published: 2007

In view of the adoption of the term “The Long War” by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to describe US operations against terrorism and state sponsored terrorism, we have decided to change the title of our long running series of studies on irregular warfare – from the Global War on Terrorism Occasional Papers to the Long War Occasional Papers.

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Leavenworth Papers No. 3 Not War, But Like War. The American Intervention in Lebanon

Not War, But Like War. The American Intervention in Lebanon

Leavenworth Papers No. 3

By Roger J. Spiller

65 Pages

Published: 1997

The study that follows began in August 1979 as a series of notes for a lecture on the employment of contingency forces at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. The lecture was intended to serve as a historical introduction to the subject, using the 1958 American intervention in Lebanon as a case in point. It was thought that by analyzing the Lebanon intervention one could demonstrate several important lessons: how political and diplomatic objectives directly affect the character of modern military operations; how an operational military plan is conceived and what evolutions it endures before it is executed; how such plans, though they appear to anticipate every operational problem, are usually unequal to the realities of operational practice; and,finally...

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Rapid Deployment Logistics: Lebanon, 1958

Rapid Deployment Logistics:

Lebanon, 1958

By Lieutenant Colonel Gary H. Wade

131 Pages

Published: 1985

The countries of the Middle East experienced intermittent crises during the 1950s. Lebanon was no exception, as internal turmoil and outside pressures threatened its existence. This research survey, however, will not dwell on the political situation of either the entire Middle East or, specifically, Lebanon in the spring of 1958.1 Suffice it to say, President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon made an urgent plea on 14 July 1958 to the governments of France, Great Britain, and the United States to deploy military forces to Lebanon to stabilize the situation. Received .in Washington at 0600 on 14 July, this message became the first test of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which had been announced in January 1957.

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Sharp Corners: Urban Operations at Century's End

Sharp Corners: Urban Operations at Century's End

By Roger J. Spiller

158 Pages

Published: 2001

This study was directed by the Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, in the summer of 1999. NATO operations against Yugoslavia had just begun. Notwithstanding official announcements that ground forces would not be needed for the time being, expectations ran high that ground troops would ultimately have to be employed. The precise nature of the operations they would be called on to perform could not be foreseen, and consequently neither the size nor the precise character of the forces to be committed could be decided at the time.

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The Proceedings of the CSI 2007 Military History Symposium - Warfare in the Age of Non-State Actors

The Proceedings of the CSI 2007 Military History Symposium - Warfare in the Age of Non-State Actors

By Kendall D. Gott

395 Pages

Published: 2007

The annual Combat Studies Institute Military History Symposium, now in its fifth year, provides a forum for the interchange of ideas on historical topics pertinent to the current doctrinal concerns of the United States Army. Furthermore, the Symposium solicits input from a diverse group of military personnel, government historians, civilian academicians, journalists and thinkers in a setting that promotes the exchange of ideas and information.

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CSI Reprint: The U.S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958

CSI Reprint: The U.S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958

By MG David W. Gray

60 Pages

Published: 1984

Lebanon was chosen because there was ample documentation, much of it only recently declassified, and because Dr. Roger Spiller had set the strategic and tactical stage in Leavenworth Paper No. 3, "Not War But Like War": The American Intervention in Lebanon. In the course of my investigation, I decided to contact several military officers who had participated in the operation. Major General (Retired) David W. Gray was one of those contacted.

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We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War

We Were Caught Unprepared

The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War

By Matt M. Matthews

105 Pages

Occassional Paper No. 26 - Published: 2008

The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to present Long War Series Occasional Paper 26, We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War by CSI historian Mr. Matt M. Matthews. The outcome of the war that was, at best, a stalemate for Israel has confounded military analysts throughout the world. Long considered the most professional and powerful army in the Middle East, with a history of impressive military victories against its enemies, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) emerged from the campaign with its enemies undefeated and its prestige severely tarnished.

Matthews’s historical analysis of the war includes an examination of IDF and Hezbollah doctrine prior to the war, as well as an overview of the operational and tactical problems encountered by the IDF during the war. His research convincingly argues that the Israeli reliance on poorly understood and controversial Effects-Based Operations (EBO) and Systemic Operational Design (SOD) warfighting theories, and a nearly singular dependence on air power, were root causes of Israeli problems. Additionally, after years of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank territories, IDF ground forces were tactically unprepared and untrained to fight against a determined Hezbollah force that conducted what was, in many ways, a conventional, fixed-position defense. In researching this study, Mr. Matthews interviewed several prominent IDF officers and other experts in the field, many of whom had not previously been interviewed. The result is an insightful, comprehensive examination of the war.

In 2006, Hezbollah demonstrated that terrorist groups around the world are capable of learning from, adapting to, and exploiting weaknesses in conventional military forces. Inasmuch as the US Army has focused almost exclusively on irregular warfare since 2001, the lessons offered in this analysis are particularly relevant. We believe that this study will be of great use to the US Army as it conducts current operations and prepares for an uncertain future in which potential enemies are watching and learning. CSI–The Past is Prologue!

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