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Leavenworth Papers 40th Anniversary 2019

Leavenworth Papers


Leavenworth Papers No. 1 The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76

The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76

Leavenworth Papers No. 1

By MAJ Robert A. Doughty

63 Pages

Published: 1979

The tactical doctrine of the US Army changed considerably between 1946 and 1976.The changes which took place were influenced by a variety of factors, including improved conventional weapons, increased mobility, the development of nuclear weapons, the desires of different military leaders, wartime demand, parochial clashes between various branches, interservice rivalry and evolving nationa security policy.

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Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939 - Leavenworth Papers 2

Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939

Leavenworth Papers No. 2

By Dr. Edward J. Drea

129 Pages

Published: 1981

Military history is the peacetime laboratory for the professional soldier. As duPicq reminds us, "only study of the past can give us a sense of reality and show us how the soldier will fight in the future." Serious study of our profession helps narrow the gap between training and battle. Publication and dissemination of tactical battle studies is the central focus of the Combat Studies Institute and the Leavenworth Paper series.

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Leavenworth Papers No. 3 Not War, But Like War. The American Intervention in Lebanon

Not War, But Like War. The American Intervention in Lebanon

Leavenworth Papers No. 3

By Roger J. Spiller

65 Pages

Published: 1981

The study that follows began in August 1979 as a series of notes for a lecture on the employment of contingency forces at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. The lecture was intended to serve as a historical introduction to the subject, using the 1958 American intervention in Lebanon as a case in point. It was thought that by analyzing the Lebanon intervention one could demonstrate several important lessons: how political and diplomatic objectives directly affect the character of modern military operations; how an operational military plan is conceived and what evolutions it endures before it is executed; how such plans, though they appear to anticipate every operational problem, are usually unequal to the realities of operational practice; and,finally...

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The Dynamics of Doctrine

The Dynamics of Doctrine

The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During The First World War

Leavenworth Papers No. 4

By Timothy T. Lupfer

76 Pages

Published: 1981

This latest Leavenworth Paper is a case study in the wartime evolution of tactical doctrine. Previous publications of the Combat Studies Institute have examined the peacetime development of doctrine and have increased our knowledge of how doctrine has been applied. With the publication of Captain Lupfer's study. "The Dynamics of Doctrine," the Combat Studies Institute adds another dimension to the history of the processes of doctrinal change.

Besides providing a summary of German Infantry tactics of the First World War, this study offers insights into the crucial role of leadership in facilitating doctrinal change during battle. It once again reminds us that success in war demands extensive and vigorous training calculated to insure that field commanders understand and apply sound tactical principles as guidelines for action and not as a substitute for good judgment. It points out the need for a timely effort in collecting and evaluating doctrinal lessons from battlefield experience.

Finally, this study reminds us of yet another fundamental lesson from the past-that tendencies toward accepting the battlefield as a routine can be a deadly error. Altering previously accepted tactics in the middle of a struggle, as the author points out, is a very urgent and serious matter. As members of the Profession of Arms, we must be sensitive to the demands of change, visionary in our examination of their implications, and creative in our adaptation of combat organizations, tactics, and techniques.

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Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies - Leavenworth Papers No. 5:

Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies

Leavenworth Papers No. 5

By Dr. Allen F. Chew

56 Pages

Published: 1981

This Leavenworth Paper contains three case studies about winter warfare drawn from twentieth century experience. It provides several valuable perspectives about this well known, but sometimes little understood subject.

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Soviet Night Operations in World War II Leavenworth Papers No. 6:

Soviet Night Operations in World War II

Leavenworth Papers No. 6

By MAJ Claude R. Sasso

66 Pages

Published: 1982

One of the more perplexing problems contemporary military planners face is that of conducting night operations. Psychologically, night has atways been a realm of the unknown and the uncertain, magnified by imaginatron. Whrle dealing with this psychological barrrer to the conduct of battle at nrght, the soldier must also cope with a myrrad of more tangrbfe problems. Coordination of forces in battle at night tests the mettle of the most proficient leader and the most hrghly trained force. Yet, the fact is that those armies that can operate successfully at night have a marked advantage over adversaries who cannot.

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August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria Leavenworth Papers No. 7:

August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria

Leavenworth Papers No. 7

By LTC David M. Glantz

260 Pages

Published: 1983

Too often soldiers fall victim to their preconceptions about potential adversaries' patterns of behavior. A popular notion among U.S. officers is that military history in the Soviet Union consists of little but propaganda broadsides to justify Soviet actions. On too few occasions do U.S. officers critically analyze the past campaigns of potential adversaries. In particular, the rich vein of military history in Russian language military periodicals and literature has been neglected. The language barrier, time constraints, and changing Army requirements combine to hinder the type of in-depth historical research that affords penetrating insights into Soviet military planning, operations, and tactics.

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 August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945 - Leavenworth Papers No. 8

August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945

Leavenworth Papers No. 8

By LTC David M. Glantz

215 Pages

Published: 1983

In this companion piece to Leavenworth Paper No. 7, "August Storm: The Soviet Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945," LTC David M. Glantz focuses on the operational and tactical levels of the Manchurian campaign, highlighting the techniques that brought victory to Soviet combined arms during the last days of World War II. In eight case studies, Lieutenant Colonel Glantz examines various kinds of military operations, from tank armies crossing mountains and desert to joint ground and riverine actions conducted over diverse terrain, from heavily wooded mountains to swampy lowlands.

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Defending the Driniumor: Covering Force Operations in New Guinea, 1944 - Leavenworth Papers No. 9

Defending the Driniumor: Covering Force Operations in New Guinea, 1944

Leavenworth Papers No. 9

By Dr. Edward J. Drea

189 Pages

Published: 1984

The U.S. Army’s extensive amphibious campaigns in the Southwest Pacific Theater during World War II have been all but forgotten today. The conduct of those far-flung operations, the sustenance of more than twenty-seven U.S. Army infantry divisions, and the imaginative planning required for bold thrusts deep into the enemy’s rear areas offer timeless lessons for commanders. Moreover, a new aspect of the Pacific War has recently surfaced: the ability of the U.S. Army to read the most secret Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) codes-in short, to “see deep” for the purposes of operational planning. This Leavenworth Paper correlates, insofar as possible, the influence of Ultra intelligence on the conduct of General Douglas MacArthur’s Aitape, New Guinea, campaign. The signals intelligence community regarded the U.S. XI Corps’s destruction of the Imperial Japanese 18th Army as one of the singular achievements of the intelligence craft during World War II.

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Chemical Warfare in World War I

Chemical Warfare in World War I

The American Experience, 1917–1918

Leavenworth Papers No. 10

By MAJ(P) Charles E. Heller, USAR

120 Pages

Published: 1984

This Leavenworth Paper chronicles the introduction of chemical agents in World War I, the U.S. Army's tentative preparations for gas warfare prior to and after American entry into the war, and the AEF experience with gas on the Western Front.

Chemical warfare affected tactics and almost changed the outcome of World War I. The overwhelming success of the first use of gas caught both sides by surprise. Fortunately, the pace of hostilities permitted the Allies to develop a suitable defense to German gas attacks and eventually to field a considerable offensive chemical capability. Nonetheless, from the introduction of chemical warfare in early 1915 until Armistice Day in November, 1918, the Allies were usually one step behind their German counterparts in the development of gas doctrine and the employment of gas tactics and procedures.

In his final report to Congress on World War I, General John J. Pershing expressed the sentiment of contemporary senior officers when he said, "Whether or not gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjecture, but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared that we can never afford to neglect the question." General Pershing was the last American field commander actually to confront chemical agents on the battlefield. Today, in light of a significant Soviet chemical threat and solid evidence of chemical warfare in Southeast and Southwest Asia, it is by no means certain he will retain that distinction.

Over 50 percent of the Total Army's Chemical Corps assets are located within the United States Army Reserve. This Leavenworth Paper was prepared by the USAA Staff Officer serving with the Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC, after a number of requests from USAA Chemical Corps officers for a historical study on the nature of chemical warfare in World War I. In fulfilling the needs of the USAR, this Leavenworth Paper also meets the needs of the Total Army in its preparations to fight, if necessary, on a battlefield where chemical agents might be employed.

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Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War II - Leavenworth Papers No. 11

Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War II

Leavenworth Papers No. 11

ByDr. Michael J. King

91 Pages

Published: 1985

This Leavenworth Paper is a critical reconstruction of World War II Ranger operations conducted at or near Djebel et Ank, Tunisia; Porto Empedocle, Sicily; Cisterna, Italy; Zerf, Germany; and Cabanatuan in the Philippines. It is not intended to be a comprehensive account of World War II Ranger operations, for such a study would have to include numerous minor actions that are too poorly documented to be studied to advantage.

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Seek, Strike, and Destroy - Leavenworth Papers No. 12

Seek, Strike, and Destroy

U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II

Leavenworth Papers No. 12

By Dr. Christopher R. Gabel

98 Pages

Published: 1985

On 3 December 1941, the War Department inaugurated a military concept unique to the U.S. Army-the tank destroyer. The term “tank destroyer” (TD) evolved into a broad concept that included personnel, equipment, and units alike. Born of a desperate need to counter the mechanized might of the so-called blitzkrieg, tank destroyer doctrine involved the pooling of antitank weapons into battalion.

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Counterattack on the Naktong, 1950 - Leavenworth Papers No. 13

Counterattack on the Naktong, 1950

Leavenworth Papers No. 13

By Dr. William Glenn Robertson

164 Pages

Published: 1986

One characteristic of virtually all large military establishments in the twentieth century has been their creation of a body of doctrinal material that in theory regulates the conduct of their future combat operations. Two sources, past experience and theoretical concepts, account for most of the intellectual underpinnings of this mass of military doctrine. Of great importance in the development of this doctrine is the analysis of actual operations that occurred during previous conflicts. This systematic analysis of past events usually results in the identification of doctrinal principles having potential validity in future wars. Military history, therefore, represents the raw material from which much doctrine is crafted.

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Leavenworth Papers No. 14 Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo 1964 - 1965

Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo 1964 - 1965

Leavenworth Papers No. 14

By MAJ Thomas P. Odom

238 Pages

Published: 1988

Leavenworth Paper No. 14, Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965 is a useful historical analysis of a cold war crisis, the resolution of which depended upon the planning and execution of joint and combined military operations. It shows how combatants react to the pressures and uncertainties associated with a rapidly changing situation in a highly politicized arena.

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Leavenworth Papers No. 15 Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965 – 1966

Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965 – 1966

Leavenworth Papers No. 15

By Dr. Lawrence A. Yates

242 Pages

Published: 1988

In the early 1960s, President John F. Kennedy expressed concern that Communist-sponsored unconventional warfare was one of the most pervasive threats to American security and that the U.S. military establishment was inadequately prepared to counter the threat. To correct this deficiency, the White House put pressure on the services, especially the U.S. Army, to develop the doctrine and forces necessary to conduct what was variously called counterinsurgency, counterguerrilla warfare, special warfare, special operations, or stability operations. As the military's capability to engage in unconventional warfare grew, so, too, did the opportunities to translate this capability into action. One such opportunity was the crisis in the Dominican Republic in 1965.

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Deception Operations - CSI Historical Bibliography No. 5

Deciding What Has To Be Done

General William E DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations

Leavenworth Papers No. 16

By Dr. Gary Bjorge

139 Pages

Published: 1988

The single most important or1gm of today's AirLand Battle doctrine was the establishment of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973 and the writing of a wholly new Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, under the supervision of the first TRADOC commander, General William E. DePuy. The writing of that manual, the first doctrinal statement of the post-Vietnam years, is the topic of this Leavenworth Paper

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The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the Arctic, October 1944

The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the Arctic, October 1944

Leavenworth Papers No. 17

By MAJ James F. Gebhardt

206 Pages

Published: 1989

Leavenworth Paper No. 17, The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the Arctic, October 1944, represents a seminal contribution to a field of historical research that has not been thoroughly explored by our Army's doctrinal community. This campaign and others, such as the defense of the Murmansk axis in 1941, are virtually unknown in the West in spite of their profound impact on the strategic outcome of the Soviet-German war on the Eastern Front. This oversight is not surprising when one considers that our Army's sole combat experience in arctic-type terrain over the last fifty years was the Aleutian campaign of 1942.

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Japan's Battle of Okinawa, April-June 1945 - Leavenworth Papers No. 18:

Japan's Battle of Okinawa, April-June 1945

Leavenworth Papers No. 18

By Thomas M. Huber

160 Pages

Published: 1990

During the Pacific war, from 1937 to 1945, the Japanese military grew to an end strength of 7 million men. Over the course of the war, this represented some 28 million man-years of uniformed service to the Japanese Empire. Imperial service spanned every conceivable environment, from subarctic in Manchuria to steaming rain forest in New Guinea, and every conceivable adversary, from a Soviet armored corps at Nomonhan in 1939 to isolated nationalist guerrillas in the Philippine archipelago. Moreover, there is an abundant literature in Japanese on these experiences in the form of official histories, unit histories, memoirs, biographies, and studies by scholars and journalists.

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Scenes From an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict Korea, 1966 – 1969 - Leavenworth Papers No. 19

Scenes From an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict Korea, 1966 – 1969

Leavenworth Papers No. 19

By MAJ Daniel P. Bolger

181 Pages

Published: 1991

Most Americans associate U.S. military operations in Korea with the Korean War, 1950-53. This is understandable in that the war, although limited in scope and objectives, was fought primarily with the weapons and tactics identified with conventional warfare. The Korean War is also remembered for the civil-military crisis it precipitated between the president of the United States, Harry Truman, and the commander of United Nations forces in Korea, General Douglas MacArthur. The Truman-MacArthur controversy is still capable of generating passionate discussion, even though the president, with the backing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, had little choice but to relieve the general of command if civilian control of the military was to be secured.

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Leavenworth Papers No. 20 Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan

Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan

Leavenworth Papers No. 20

By Robert F. Baumann

231 Pages

Published: 1993

Primarily employing Russian sources, including important archival documents only recently declassified and made available to Western scholars, Dr. Baumann provides an insightful look at the Russian conquest of the Caucasian mountaineers (1B01-59), the subjugation of Central Asia ( 1839-81 ), the reconquest of Central Asia by the Red Army ( 1918-33), and the Soviet war in Afghanistan ( 1979--89). The history of these wars-especially as it relates to the battle tactics, force structure, and strategy employed in them-offers important new perspectives on elements of continuity and change in combat over two centuries. This is the first study to provide an in-depth examination of the evolution of the Russian and Soviet unconventional experience on the predominantly Muslim southern periphery of the former empire.

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The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War

The Albatross of Decisive Victory

Leavenworth Papers No. 21

By Dr. George W. Gawrych

106 Pages

Published: 1996

The observation that military establishments in peacetime generally prepare to fight their last war has acquired the status of a cliche. Whatever the merit of this generalization, it should not suggest that, in the wake of hostilities, military professionals should foreswear changes and adjustments designed to make their forces more proficient on future battlefields. Indeed, military forces that have just suffered a costly defeat often manifest a greater readiness to initiate military reforms than those that have experienced a decisive victory. One will recall, for example, that following 1763, some of the most original thinking on military reform, organization, and tactics came out of France, a country that had paid dearly for its loss in the just-completed Seven Years' War. A case in point more familiar to today's U.S. officer corps is the reorientation of their Army's military doctrine in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Dr. George Gawrych reminds us of another instance in his Leavenworth Paper, The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory-the example of the Egyptian armed forces, who following Egypt's humiliation in the 1967 Six-Day War, made significant changes to their force structure and tactics. The Egyptians may have been preparing for something like their last war, but given a chance to refight it, they prepared for a different outcome.

The victors in a conflict are often less inclined than the vanquished to make radical departures from methods and means that, after all, had proved effective. In a postwar period, analysis by the winners will proceed apace, new technology and weapons will be incorporated into the inventory, and appropriate adjustments will be made. But short of a dramatic change in the external environment, these developments will often serve only to reinforce the conventional wisdom bred of earlier military success. Sometimes, this intellectual and institutional inertia might prove to be exactly what is required. In other cases, it might lead to disaster or near disaster-as the Israelis discovered to their dismay in 1973. Decisive victory in 1967, as Dr. Gawrych points out, became an albatross for Israeli military leaders who, wed as they were to the lessons of 1967, lacked the flexibility to recognize, much less adapt to, a dynamic, rapidly changing situation.

Most military professionals think of themselves as open-minded and flexible. They would be shocked, probably angered, to be described otherwise. In this context, as the reader may conclude from Dr. Gawrych's account, self-deception and overconfidence can be the worst enemies of officers in peacetime, to be guarded against with all their powers of perception and analysis.

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Moving the Enemy: Operational Art in the Chinese PLA's Huai Hai Campaign (revised) - Leavenworth Papers No. 22

Moving the Enemy: Operational Art in the Chinese PLA's Huai Hai Campaign (revised)

Leavenworth Papers No. 22

By Dr. Gary Bjorge

282 Pages

Published: 2003

The genesis of this book lies so many years in the past that it is hard to imagine that it is actually being published. In 1986, as a member of the Research Committee in the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), I was tasked to study the Huai Hai Campaign as an example of large-unit maneuver. As part of that assignment, I asked for, and was granted, an invitation from the Chinese Academy of Military Science (AMS) to visit China to conduct research on the campaign.

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Third War: Irregular Warfare on the Western Border 1862-1865

Third War Irregular Warfare on the Western Border 1862–1865

Leavenworth Papers No. 23

By James B. Martin, Ph.D.

180 Pages

Published: 2012

Like many students of history in the United States, I have always been enthralled by the American Civil War. This short period in American History has captured the imagination of Americans and spurred them to consume the many volumes written about this brother-against-brother conflict. Most of these volumes have dealt with the important battles of the war, which pitted massive armies from the North and South against each other in a struggle to determine whether the country would separate or stay together. These battles, highlighted by Gettysburg, Antietam, Vicksburg, Fredericksburg, and others too numerous to mention, were the predecessors of similar grand conflicts that would rack Europe and the world in the decades to follow. Arguably, for the first time in history, an entire nation mobilized to conduct a war that would eventually spill over and affect most of the population. From the gentlemanly preparation for the First Battle of Bull Run to the consuming power of Sherman’s march to the sea, the American Civil War involved far more of the American population than war in Europe historically had involved.

Least understood of the effects on this population, and least studied, is the personal war conducted in the Border States, where the North met the South. The number of titles written on this irregular warfare is dwarfed in the literature of the Civil War, with most of the early volumes being markedly partisan. Most of these focused on the violence at the Kansas and Missouri border which, while the most deadly, was by no means the only irregular violence along a border. Every state on the western border, from the gulf coast of Texas to the hills of Appalachia in Kentucky, was consumed by a violence that filled every street and town. This violence was not the type found on the battlefield at Gettysburg, where hoards of men in blue or gray shot at each other from considerable distance, finally moving to close quarters combat. This was a war that flowed into every barnyard or town square, pitting men with strong beliefs supporting one side against individuals they believed to be their enemy. One historian pointed out that “guerrilla war normally arises in impassioned circumstances” and the irregular war in the American Civil War was no exception.*

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Leavenworth Paper 24: Forging the Ninth Army-XXIX TAC Team The Development, Training, and Application of American Air-Ground Doctrine in World War II

Forging the Ninth Army-XXIX TAC Team

The Development, Training, and Application of American Air-Ground Doctrine in World War II

Leavenworth Paper 24

By Christopher M. Rein, Ph.D.

211 Pages

Published: 2019

Forging the Ninth Army –XXIX Team: The Development, Training, and Application of American Air Ground Doctrine in World War II by Christopher M. Rein, Ph.D. is the latest volume in the Leavenworth Paper series. This study tells the story of how before D-Day, the US Army developed new doctrine and training for its air-ground teams. As Dr. Rein shows, the close air support provided by these teams often proved decisive as the Allies fought their way across the Rhine and defeated Germany.

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