2017 Online Exclusive Articles

Online Exclusive articles are published only online to support timely discussion on emerging time-sensitive issues. Online publication also allows us to publish more articles than before due to the unconstrained nature of the website. To view online exclusive articles from previous years, see https://www.armyupress.army.mil/journals/military-review/online-exclusive-archives/.

December 2017 Online Exclusive Articles

Response to Dealing with Toxic Leaders and Bad Bosses

Maj. Alex Willard, U.S. Army

An Army officer provides insight and an alternate perspective on a November 2017 Military Review Online Exclusive article offering practical steps for dealing with toxic leaders and bad bosses.

Article published on: 28 December 2017

November 2017 Online Exclusive Articles

Practical Lessons Learned for Dealing with Toxic Leaders and Bad Bosses

James W. Shufelt Jr.
Clinton O. Longenecker, PhD

The authors analyze and distill wisdom and insight from leaders operating in civilian workforces to provide practical take aways for mitigating the negative influences of a toxic or bad boss.

Article published on: 28 November 2017

Strategic Communication A Caution to Military Commanders

Capt. J. D. Scanlon, Royal Canadian Navy, Retired

A former Canadian armed forces public affairs officer discusses the importance of strategic communication as a tool for the NATO alliance, and argues that public affairs is critical in strategic communication planning and execution.

Article published on: 3 November 2017

October 2017 Online Exclusive Articles

Learning Organizations Transforming U.S. Air Force Squadrons from Masters of Adaptation to Engines of Innovation

Maj. Robert Nelson, U.S. Air Force

There is little doubt that Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen. David L. Goldfein believes in the power of squadrons—but do they deserve it? Goldfein highlighted squadrons in his first focus paper as chief of staff, underscoring his desire to revitalize what he terms “the beating heart of the United States Air Force; our most essential team.”

Article published on: 23 October 2017

September 2017 Online Exclusive Articles

The Practical Application of Followership Theory in Mission Command

Lt. Col. Mikail Kalimuddin, Singapore Army

In their 2014 article “Followership: Exercising Discretion,” Ted Thomas and Paul Berg discuss the complementary relationship between mission command and followership theory.1 While the article presents a convincing argument as to why military leaders who exercise mission command stand to benefit from a thorough understanding of followership, it stops short of providing a practical guide on how followership theory can be applied in the context of mission command.

Article published on: 29 September 2017

Russian Actions and Methods against the United States and NATO

AFCEA 2017 award 2nd

Maj. Collins Devon Cockrell, U.S. Army

The author discusses Russian and Western information doctrine and methods. He attempts to introduce the reader to a rapidly growing body of open source research analyzing the significant threat of Russian actions against U.S. allies and treaty partners.

Article published on: 22 September 2017

August 2017 Online Exclusive Articles

North Korea Policy - Changed Regime

Col. James M. Minnich, U.S. Army

With respect to North Korea, the author espouses a U.S. policy of changed regime over regime change—effecting change from within that country by establishing conditions that encourage Seoul and Pyongyang to pursue an agreement that permits both to exist peacefully and prosperously.

Article published on: 30 August 2017

Is Failure the Right Training Strategy?

Maj. Jerod J. Madden, U.S. Army

An experienced Observer-Coach/Trainer in the Mission Command Training Program argues that the approach to conducting training in warfighter exercises needs to better account for the detrimental psychological impact of repeated, unavoidable failure.

Article published on: 28 August 2017

July 2017 Online Exclusive Articles

A Response to Leeroy Jenkins and Mission Command

Maj. Steven Miller, U.S. Army, Retired

In response to Maj. Robert Phillipson's article on mission command, the author invites readers to develop a more nuanced understanding of the tension underlying planning that inevitably arises when striving to balance a shared, complete picture and the latitude to act.

Article published on: 21 July 2017

June 2017 Online Exclusive Articles

Theater Land Operations

Relevant Observations and Lessons from the Combined Joint Land Force Experience in Iraq

Lt. Gen. Gary Volesky, U.S. Army
Maj. Gen. Roger Noble, Australian Army

In 2016, the campaign to destroy the Islamic State as a fighting force while also pushing any remaining fighters out of Iraq was in full swing. The combined joint force land component command (CJFLCC) in charge of the joint fight during Operation Inherent Resolve was based on the headquarters of the 101st Airborne Division, but the mission differed notably from previous division-level efforts during the coalition-led counterinsurgency fight in Iraq.

Article published on: 7 June 2017

Shattering the Snow Dome

How Army Ground Forces can Meaningfully Contribute to Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

Brad Marvel

The author articulates how the Army can and should contribute to the suppression of enemy air defenses. He argues that the Army must take a proactive and aggressive role alongside the air component, enabling friendly air power and ensuring freedom of action in the air domain.

Article published on: 7 June 2017

Reframing the Human Dimension

Gardner’s “Five Minds for the Future”

Col. Nicholas Marsella, U.S. Army, Retired

The author argues that the Army would benefit from incorporating Howard Gardner's five minds to cultivate for the twenty-first century: the disciplined mind, synthesizing mind, creating mind, respectful mind, and ethical mind. Integrating these concepts into Army thinking on the human dimension would add clarity and structure.p>

Article published on: 6 June 2017

May 2017 Online Exclusive Articles

The Myopic Muddle of the Army’s Operations Doctrine

Maj. Daniel J. Kull, U.S. Army

The author critiques 2016 Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Operations, and Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, Operations. In his close analysis of the text, he finds multiple ways that doctrine writers have not clearly envisioned and articulated how the Army should be prioritizing its efforts to prepare for future conflict.

Article published on: May 24, 2017

Army Future Force Experimentation

Maj. Richard G. Ricklefs, U.S. Army, Retired

A member of the Campaign of Learning team discusses the findings from Unified Challenge 2016. Unified Challenge is methodically structured to determine the needed operational and organizational concepts of the Army in 2030.

Article published on: May 23, 2017

Leeroy Jenkins and Mission Command

Maj. Robert R. Phillipson, U.S. Army

The author uses an infamous story of Leeroy Jenkins in an online game of War of Worldcraft to raise important points about some current holes in conveying commander's intent to subordinates.

Article published on: May 16, 2017

The Center of Gravity

Still Relevant After All These Years?

Col. Dale C. Eikmeier, U.S. Army, Retired

The author reviews recent arguments on the utility and relevancy of the center of gravity concept to planning. In analyzing these arguments, he concludes that the center of gravity concept continues to have value for planning efforts.

Article published on: May 11, 2017

The European War

(Army University Press republishing Military Review article from 1939.)

Lt. Col. E. M. Benitez

War tactics, despite spectacular new weapons, have changed little in 2,000 years. What Hannibal's Carthaginians did to the Romans at Cannae, southeastern Italy, in 216 B.C., the Germans did to the Poles last September. It may sound like a paradox that in an age of machine guns, tanks, and airplanes, we should evoke the ghost of the Roman and Carthaginian Armies.

Article published on: December 1939

April 2017 Online Exclusive Articles

Leadership in a Starfish-Spider-Continuum

Implications of an Increasing Complexity to Commanders and Organizational Leaders

Lt. Col. Thomas Kopsch, German Army

The 3rd place winner of the 2016 MacArthur Award articulates how important it is for military members to have a clear and cogent understanding of problem complexity. Agility and adaptability can be better integrated into the military decision-making process by changing how leaders understand and define problem sets.

Article published on: April 13, 2017

The Army's Heritage as a Coalition Force

(Army University Press republishing Military Review article from 1993.)

Major John W. Peabody, US Army

The American Revolution is generally treated at the strategic level as one, or a combination, of the following: a civil war, a colonial rebellion or a coalition war primarily with French allies, but the new American states themselves constituted a fragile coalition.1 This muitidimensional aspect of the war complicated the already difficult internal cohesion of the colonies, but the fundamental nature of the conflict evolved around the dynamics of keeping the states involved in a coalitional rebellion against Britain.

Article published on: January 1993

Learning to Win While Fighting Outnumbered

General Donn A. Starry and the Challenge of Institutional Leadership during a Period of Reform and Modernization

Maj. R. Z. Alessi-Friedlander, U.S. Army

The 2nd place 2016 MacArthur winner uses the example of Gen. Donn A. Starry's efforts to develop AirLand Battle to illustrate the need for theory and practice to merge, as well as the need for the institutional Army to define and solve specific problems.

March 2017 Online Exclusive Articles

The Indo-Asia Pacific and the Multi-Domain Battle Concept

By Gen. Robert B. Brown, U.S. Army, Commander of United States Army Pacific

The Multi-Domain Battle concept will integrate all U.S. Armed Forces in future conflicts in the Indo-Asia Pacific region and involve actions across multiple domains—land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace.

Article published on: March 14, 2017

How to Build an Armadillo:

Lessons Learned from the First Forward-Deployed THAAD Battery

By Lt. Col. Jonathan C. Stafford, U.S. Army

In response to an increasing number of threatening provocations by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the U.S. Army is deploying the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to selected locations in the Pacific to defend both U.S. territory as well as the territory of our allies, including the Republic of Korea. THAAD is the Army’s newest and most advanced missile defense system.

Article published on: March 10, 2017

Operation Anaconda, Shah-i-Khot Valley, Afghanistan, 2-10 March 2002

By Adam Geibel

As of 2 March 2002, Operation Anaconda was the largest combat operation in Afghanistan of the War on Terrorism that began after the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. Major General F.L. Hagenbeck, commander of the U.S. Army 10th Mountain Division, led the major effort to clean out remaining al-Qaeda fighters and their Taliban allies in the Shah-i-Khot Valley.

Article published on: March 9, 2017

Stability Operations in Syria:

The Need for a Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs

By Anthony H. Cordesman

The United States needs a shift in its approach to civil-military affairs if it is to be successful in fighting failed-state wars that involve major counterinsurgency campaigns and reliance on host-nation forces; the situation in Syria illustrates all too clearly that any military effort to avoid dealing with the full consequences of the civil side of war can be a recipe for failure.

Article published on: March 2, 2017

January 2017 Online Exclusive Articles

III Corps during the Surge:

A Study in Operational Art

By Maj. Wilson C. Blythe Jr., U.S. Army

The role of Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno’s III Corps as Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) has failed to receive sufficient attention from studies of the 2007 surge in Iraq.

Article published on: January 3, 2017